Is this a question? Not for long. The statement bias. by Pandelaere, Mario & Dewitte, Siegfried
Is this a question? Not for long.  








Running head: Statement bias 
 
Mario Pandelaere, post-doctoral researcher, Applied Economic Sciences, Universiteit 
Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. Siegfried Dewitte, assistant 
professor marketing, Applied Economic Sciences, Universiteit Leuven, Naamsestraat 
69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. Address correspondence to Mario Pandelaere, Applied 
Economic Sciences, Universiteit Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; 
tel: +32 (0)16 326955; e-mail: Mario.Pandelaere@econ.kuleuven.be. 
 
Acknowledgments. 
We thank Tom Meyvis, Caroline Goukens, and Vicky Dierckx for their valuable 




 Statement bias  2
Abstract 
 
Four experiments demonstrate a ‘statement bias’: questions are more often 
misremembered as statements than vice versa. Experiment 1 suggests that the bias 
increases with increasing item comprehensibility. This finding rules out that the 
statement bias is only  due to the belief that statements are more prevalent in 
communication than questions are. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the statement bias 
is related to depth of processing at encoding. Experiment 3 shows that the bias occurs 
irrespective of the truth of the statement underlying the sentence. Experiment 4 shows 
that the statement bias is also obtained for sentences pertaining to products and 
services. 
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Is this a question? Not for long. 
The statement bias. 
 
Language serves a lot of functions and the same s entence make take on 
different meanings by virtue of the context in which it is used, or even depending on 
the intonation used when uttering the sentence. Language comprehension is therefore 
a complex issue. Understanding how people comprehend language in  general may 
yield new insights as to how consumers understand product claims, in advertising 
consumer reports or disseminated in chat groups.  
A number of recent studies have focused on how consumers deal with specific 
types of questions. For instance, Ahluwalia and Burnkrant (2003) have investigated 
under what circumstances rhetorical questions may increase or diminish persuasion. 
Morwitz, Johnson and Schmittlein (1993) demonstrated that asking intention 
questions may actually affect consumers’ behavior, at least to the extent that intention 
questions are not considered to be persuasion attempts (Williams, Fitzsimons and 
Block 2004). Fiedler et al. (1996) found that asking presupposing questions trigger 
constructive processes that may distort factual memory later on (see also Loftus 
1975). In the context of consumer behavior, this may imply that asking questions that 
presuppose the relation between an object and a desirable attribute may render the 
attitude towards the object more positive. Finally, embedding information in a 
hypothetical question has also been demonstrated to influence consumers’ attitudes 
and subsequent choice (Fitzsimons and Shiv 2001). 
Whereas the questions used in the studies above have very specific linguistic 
functions, i n the current  paper, we  investigate  the process underlying the 
comprehension of simple, neutral questions. We propose that, when people try to Statement bias  4
comprehend a  question, they  represent the content as a proposition (i.e., as a 
statement) which may be stored in memory. Even i f the question is subsequently 
identified and stored as such, the initially stored proposition might distort recall of the 
sentence format. As a result, a question may not be remembered as a question but 
rather as a statement.  In the context of consumer behavior, this may imply that 
questions used in advertisements, for instance, may become confused with product 
claims. Clearly, the assumed  propositional representation phase of sentence 
comprehension also implies that statements are not easily ‘remembered’ as questions. 
Indeed, the propositional representation of a statement is simply the statement itself. 
In sum, we predict that questions will be misremembered as statements more often 
than vice versa. We will refer to this asymmetric confusion pattern as the statement 
bias. 
Findings of two studies are consistent with the postulated statement bias but 
are also open to alternative explanations. First, Fiedler et al. (1996) exposed their 
participants  to several scenes. Afterwards, they  had to evaluate whether c ertain 
objects had been present in the scenes. In between,  some participants  received  a 
question about object X that had not been present in the scene and some participants 
did not. Participants were more likely to have ‘seen’ object X when they had received 
the question  about object X  than when they had not. This questioning effect was 
obtained even  if the participants had correctly answered not having seen the object. 
Clearly, this finding is consistent with a statement bias. We suggest that the question 
‘Was there an  object X?’  may have been represented as ‘There was an object X’ 
during comprehension. This may have distorted correct recognition in a later phase.  
However, the questioning effect may also have been the result of constructive 
memory processes. Indeed, Fiedler et al. (1996) showed that misrecognition of X was Statement bias  5
much larger after  presupposing questions  than after  non-presupposing questions. 
Presupposing questions already imply the presence of an object (e.g. ‘Was object X 
made of Y?’) whereas non-presupposing questions do not (e.g. ‘Was there an object 
X?’). According to Fiedler et al., when attempting to answer a presupposition, people 
project object X in the scene. For non-presupposing questions, they project the scene 
and try to evaluate whether X was in the scene.  Although the visual memory 
construction was considerably weaker in the case of non-presupposing questions, it 
might nevertheless be responsible for the questioning effect reported above. That is, 
the question ‘Was there an object X?’ still might have led some to project object X in 
the scene. As a consequence, the questioning effect shown in Fiedler et al.’s first two 
experiments are merely suggestive with respect to the existence of a statement bias. A 
more straightforward test  for the statement bias would keep the possible memory 
construction process constant.  
A second piece of suggestive evidence dates from the heydays of 
transformational grammar. This theory postulated that  during comprehension, 
sentences are decomposed in a kernel and the grammatical transformations applied to 
the kernel  (such as passive, negation, and questions; for a recent overview, see 
Townsend and Bever 2001). The theory implies that confusion rates between kernel 
and transformations are symmetric because the  transformational distance is 
considered  Euclidian.  Inconsistent with transformational grammar theory, Mehler 
presented confusion rates for questions that were asymmetric (1963, Table 1, p. 348). 
Clifton and Odom (1966) also measured dissimilarity between kernels, question and 
other transformations, and also reported asymmetries (experiments 1  and  2). 
However, they attributed the asymmetries in their studies and Mehler’s to a “greater 
frequency of use in language” (i.e. to the belief that statements occur more frequently Statement bias  6
in everyday communication than questions do or, in other words, to a background 
bias) and not to the way sentences are processed.  
To test the hypothesis that questions will be misrecognized as statements more 
often than vice versa, we use a  forced choice paradigm: Participants are presented 
with statements and questions.  Later on, they receive the same content in both 
statement and question format and they then have to identify which format they have 
seen earlier. Our prediction is that more questions will be misidentified as statements 
than vice versa.  
Of course, it is possible that part of this statement bias is not due to the 
propositional representation process that we postulate but rather to the fact that people 
simply a ssume that, in any communication, statements are more prevalent than 
questions. Therefore, in case of doubt they might choose statement. We will refer to 
this ‘rational guessing’ as the background bias (cf. Clifton and Odom 1965). We will 
show that although background bias may play a role, it can not explain the entire the 
statement bias.  
In three experiments, we demonstrate the statement bias and show that it is 
attenuated when  comprehension is hindered and boosted  when  additional semantic 
processing is  required. In the f irst experiment, we manipulate  the ease of 
comprehension. In the second experiment, we also manipulate the extent of semantic 
processing. In experiment 3, we show that the statement bias is independent of the 
truth of the proposition that is represented during  comprehension. As we wanted to 
study the statement bias without the added complexity of coping attempts with 
persuasive messages, we used biology and mathematics sentences rather than 
sentences about products or services. In a fourth experiment, we therefore replicated 




The aim of  experiment 1 is to show the confusion asymmetry  between 
statements and questions and to demonstrate that comprehension plays an important 
role in this bias. We presented participants with sentences that were either 
comprehensible (biology items; e.g. Fresh water snakes swim upside down for about 
half of the time.) or  rather  incomprehensible (mathematics items; e.g., ‘Any 
memomorph function is  a homomorph function’). Half of the sentences  in  each 
domain were shown in statement format and half in question format. We expected that 
questions would be  mistaken for  statements  more often than vice versa.  Further, 
because propositional representation requires comprehension, we expected a larger 
statement  bias for biology than for mathematics sentences.  If the sentence is 
incomprehensible, people may  not represent it as a proposition. Any remaining bias 





Participants. Sixty-four college students with  various majors participated in 
exchange for a participation fee of 6 Euro (€1 ˜ $1). The study was part of a series of 
unrelated studies taking about an hour.  
 
Material. A list of 20 biology and 20 mathematics statements was compiled. A 
sample of students of the same population (n = 15) rated the truth of the statements on Statement bias  8
a scale ranging from 0 (I know this statement to be untrue) to 10 (I know this 
statement to be true). The neutral midpoint reflected uncertainty. Twelve mathematics 
and twelve biology statements with average closest to 5 were selected. 
 
Procedure. Participants saw the selected sentences on a computer screen and 
first had to estimate what percentage of the population would actually understand the 
sentences. Per domain, h alf of the items were formulated as questions and half as 
statements (randomly selected  per individual).  Then participants received  all the 
sentences both as a question and as a statement one above the other (randomized 
order) on paper. Participants had to indicate which of the two formats they had seen: 
statement or question. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Biology items (M = 66.23) were rated more comprehensible than mathematics 
items ( M  = 43.73),  t(63) = 19.00,  p < .001,  validating our  comprehensibility 
manipulation. 
  For each participant, we calculated the relative ‘bias towards statement’ for 
biology and mathematics separately. Relative bias was defined as the number of 
questions that was incorrectly remembered as statements, divided by the total number 
of  confusions  for that participant and domain (i.e. the sum of the number of 
statements that w as incorrectly  remembered as questions and vice versa).  One 
participant made no errors for either domain and was discarded (as relative bias is 
then undefined). For interpretation purposes, 0.5 was subtracted from the individual Statement bias  9
relative biases. As a result, zero implies no bias; a positive number indicates bias 
towards statement and a negative number implies bias towards question. 
For biology items, the relative bias was .33, t(62) = 12.28, p < .001. For 
mathematics items, it was .11, t(62) = 3.24, p < .01. The relative bias was larger for 
biology items than for mathematics items, t(62) = 5.29, p < .001. Background bias 
could account for the bias for mathematics items, but not for the substantial difference 
between domains. The fact that the bias is much stronger for the biology items 
strongly suggests that comprehensibility plays an important role. This is consistent 
with our hypothesis that the bias is mostly due to the propositional representation step 
of comprehension.  
However, the current findings are also amenable to an alternative explanation. 
It is possible that the relative bias is not caused during encoding but rather during the 
test phase of the experiment. Indeed, participants may have decided on statement or 
question relying  on the relative  fluency with which they could process the two 
response options (cf. Whittlesea 1993). For biology, statements may have been much 
easier to process than questions. As a result, participants may have indicated more 
often ‘statement’ than ‘question’. For mathematics,  in contrast, the difference in 
processing fluency between statements and questions may have been far less 
pronounced, resulting in a lower bias. In Experiment 2, we seek further support for 
our position  that the confusion occurs at encoding  by  manipulating semantic 
processing  at encoding. In addition, we will remove background bias by giving 
participants categorization processing goals, which have been shown to result in 
rather accurate estimation of the relative sizes of the categories involved (e.g., Freund 
and Hasher 1989). 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The aim of experiment 2 is twofold. First, we want to replicate the findings of 
the first experiment. Second, we want to find additional evidence for the proposed 
involvement of propositional representation by ruling out the ‘response’ explanation. 
That is, we try to obtain a clearer picture of the role of the propositional 
representation stage of comprehension in the statement bias. First,  we  attempt to 
remove the background bias by asking our participants to categorize each sentence as 
either a question or a statement. Previous studies have shown that categorization into 
relevant categories  at encoding  indeed enables people to estimate the relative 
frequencies of the categories fairly accurately (e.g., Freund and Hasher 1989).  
Second, in addition to the categorization task, some participants also have to 
judge the comprehensibility of the items (as in experiment 1) whereas others do not. 
As more processing (and consequently an enhanced propositional representation) is 
involved when participants have to judge the comprehensibility than  when they do 
not, we expect a higher bias following judgment and categorization than following 
mere categorization.  Third, we also manipulated the punctuation: For half of the 
participants, the end punctuation is present (as in experiment 1), whereas for the other 
half, it  is absent.  The presence versus absence of end punctuation is assumed to 
independently  affect the  propositional representation process. Indeed,  given the 
categorization instructions, end punctuation unambiguously informs on the sentence 
format without the need for additional processing,  and hence  does not require 
propositional representation. I n contrast, in the absence of  end  punctuation, 
participants have to read the e ntire sentence, during which the content may be 
represented as a proposition. So,  end punctuation is expected to decrease the Statement bias  11
statement bias. It should be noted that according to a ‘response’ explanation of the 
statement bias, end punctuation and the comprehensibility judgment task should not 
affect the magnitude of the statement bias because these factors exert their influence 
solely at the encoding phase. 
Clearly, in the condition involving mere categorization and end punctuation, 
participants do not have to process the sentence. As a result, no propositional 
representation is required. Consequently, we do not expect a statement bias in this 
condition. Further, considering that categorization results in a fair knowledge of the 
relative distribution of questions and statements we expect no statement  bias to 
remain in this condition. 
In summary, the experiment is a 2   ×  2  ×  2 design. All participants have 
categorization goals. In addition, we manipulate end punctuation (between subjects), 
comprehension evaluation instructions (between subjects) and domain (within 
subjects). We expect three main effects according to the effect the manipulations have 
on comprehension. End punctuation should reduce the statement bias, whereas 
comprehension evaluation instructions  should increase it. Again, we expect the 




Participants. One hundred and fourteen college students with various majors 
participated in exchange for a participation fee of 6 Euro (€1 ˜ $1). The study was 
part of a series of unrelated studies taking about an hour.  
 
Procedure. The material was identical to that of  experiment 1. Participants Statement bias  12
were randomly assigned to one of t he cells o f Processing  (categorization + 
comprehensibility  judgment  versus mere categorization) by Punctuation (present 
versus absent) design.  All participants had to categorize the sentences as either 
question or statement by clicking radio buttons indicating ‘statement’ and ‘question’ 
(categorization). In addition, half of the participants had to estimate what percentage 
of the population would actually understand the sentences (comprehensibility). As in 
experiment 1, per domain, half of the items were formulated as questions and half as 
statements (randomly selected per individual). However, in contrast to experiment 1, 
for half of the participants, no punctuation was present whereas for the other half, the 
sentences contained the usual punctuation (as in experiment 1). Finally, participants 
engaged in the forced choice task on PC. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
  As intended, biology items (M  =  43.76) were more comprehensible than 
mathematics items (M = 25.75), t(1,55) = 9.42, p < .001. For each participant, we then 
calculated the relative bias towards statement for biology and mathematics separately.
  The relative biases for mathematics could be calculated for all participants, 
whereas for biology they could be calculated for only 112 of the 114 participants. The 
relative biases were analyzed using a  2  (Processing:  categorization + 
comprehensibility versus mere categorization)  by 2 (Punctuation: present versus 
absent) by 2 (Domain: biology or mathematics) ANOVA. We used a mixed model 
approach because in contrast t o univariate and multivariate repeated measures 
ANOVA, it does not imply dropping a participant if one of the two biases is missing.  Statement bias  13
As expected, the analysis yielded three main effects; all other effects were not 
significant, all Fs < 2.01, all ps > .15. The main effect of Domain, F(1,109) = 10.25, p 
< .01, revealed a higher bias for biology (M = .20, t(107) = 7.29, p < .001) than for 
mathematics (M = .10, t(110) = 3.52,  p < .001). This replicates Experiment 1 and 
supports the hypothesis that propositional representation is more difficult for less 
comprehensible items, resulting in a substantially lower statement bias. 
The main effect of Punctuation, F(1,110) = 7.03, p < .01, showed a higher bias 
if punctuation was absent (M = .21, t(109) = 6.96, p < .001) than if it was present (M 
= .09,  t(111) =  2.90,  p < .01).  This is consistent with the notion that,  given 
categorization instructions, punctuation reduces the need for processing. Finally, the 
main effect of Judgment, F(1,110) = 16.00, p < .001, demonstrated a higher bias when 
participants made a comprehensibility judgment (M = .24, t(110) = 7.61, p < .001) 
than when they did not (M = .06, t(110) = 2.06, p < .05).  This is consistent with the 
notion that evaluating comprehensibility requires deeper processing. In all, the three 
main effects (domain, punctuation, and comprehensibility) support the hypothesis that 
depth of processing is positively related to the bias. Table 1 shows the biases in every 
cell. Additional support for the hypothesis that propositional representation drives the 
bias comes from the finding that no bias remains in the punctuation condition with 
categorization instructions. Irrespective of domain, the bias is not significantly 
different from zero ( both  ts < 0.64, both  ps > .64).  Illustratively, i n  the condition 
involving maximal processing (biology items, evaluating  comprehensibility, 
categorization as question vs. statement without punctuation information), the bias 
(0.36) is close to its maximum (0.50). That is, for every seven errors a participant 
makes, six confuse a question with a statement (raw bias of .86).  
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Table 1. Bias toward Statement as a Function of Processing and Punctuation (SE in 
parentheses; subscripts denote the statistical significance of the biases in each cell). 
  Mere categorization 
(n = 58) 
Categorization + judgment 
(n = 56) 
Mathematics     
Punctuation  .01 (.055)  .10
 * (.057) 
no punctuation  .02 (.053)  .26
 *** (.053) 
Biology     
Punctuation  .03 (.056)  .23
 *** (.060) 
no punctuation  .20
 *** (.054)  .36
 *** (.054) 
Overall     
Punctuation  .02 (.044)  .17
 *** (.046) 
no punctuation  .11
 ** (.042)  .31
 *** (.042) 
* p = .068; 
** p < .05; 




In the previous experiments, we demonstrated the existence of the statement 
bias.  Questions are more often misrecognized as statements than vice versa. 
Moreover, the statement bias is stronger for comprehensible than for 
incomprehensible sentences (exp. 1 and 2). Finally, processing depth at encoding is 
related to the statement bias (exp. 2). The latter finding ruled out an explanation in 
terms of  relative fluency of the two options (i.e. statement vs. question) during 
recognition. However, it still leaves open the possibility that absolute fluency during 
recognition drives (part of) the statement bias. Specifically, conceptually fluent 
statements (e.g. truisms) might seem so familiar that they are “recognized” more 
easily (cf. Whittlesea 1993). Statement bias  15
To test this second ‘response’ explanation, we manipulated the plausibility of 
the statement underlying the sentence. In particular, we used blatantly true, blatantly 
false and plausible items. If the choice between statement and question depends on the 
fluency of the statement, then the statement bias should be more pronounced if the 
underlying statement is blatantly true than if it is merely plausible. In addition, it 
should be more pronounced if the underlying statement is plausible than if it is 
blatantly false. However, if comprehension at encoding drives the statement bias, the 
plausibility of a statement should not moderate the statement bias. Irrespective of the 
plausibility of the underlying statement, every question should be represented as a 
statement during the comprehension phase, and this process is believed to produce the 
asymmetric confusion between statements and questions during recognition.  
In addition, to further demonstrate the importance of comprehensibility in the 
statement, we chose to manipulate comprehensibility within domains rather than 
across domains.  This also reduces the concern that the domain effect found in 
experiments 1 and 2 would be related to another difference between the biology and 
mathematics items than their comprehensibility.  Participants either saw 
comprehensible biology items or incomprehensible biology items. In addition, the 
plausibility of the comprehensible items varied from blatantly true, over plausible but 
unknown, to blatantly false. Note that we could not vary the plausibility of 
incomprehensible items because truth evaluation requires comprehension. If 
comprehension alone underlies the statement bias then the bias should be lower for 
incomprehensible items than for comprehensible items, irrespective of their truth 
value. For the comprehensible items, the plausibility of the items should not affect the 
bias.  
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Method 
 
Participants. One hundred and fifty-eight college students with various majors 
participated for either course credit or payment (€ 6) in an experimental session which 
contained the current experiment. Type of credit did not exert any influence and is not 
discussed further.  
 
Material. The 12 mathematics items of the previous experiments were used as 
filler items. A list of new biology items was compiled consisting of 24 items that were 
comprehensible but for which the correctness was not obvious, 24 items that were 
comprehensible and blatantly true, 24 items that were comprehensible and blatantly 
false, and 24 items that were incomprehensible (and by consequence for which the 
correctness was not obvious).  The incomprehensible items were produced by 
substituting  Latin  terms for the common terms in the comprehensible items.  In a 
pretest, a different sample of students (n = 79) of the same population rated the truth 
of the statements on a scale ranging from 0 (I know this statement to be untrue) to 10 
(I know this statement to be true). The neutral midpoint was reserved for statements 
for which participants did not know whether or not the statement was true. We 
selected the best 12 biology items of each of the four types: incomprehensible, 
comprehensible unknown truth, comprehensible true and comprehensible false. The 
plausibility of the incomprehensible items did not differ from the plausibility of the 
“comprehensible unknown truth” items. “Comprehensible true” items were 
significantly more plausible than either of the former whereas “comprehensible false” 
items were significantly less plausible than all the former.  
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Procedure. All participants had to indicate how comprehensible the sentences 
were on a scale from 0 (not comprehensible at all) to 10 (entirely comprehensible). 
Participants received the usual mathematics items and one of the four types of biology 
items (incomprehensible [e.g.,  Tamandoea  belong to the species of edentata], 
comprehensible unknown truth [e.g.,  Ant eaters have few or no teeth], 
comprehensible true [e.g., Ant eaters eat termites as well as ants], and comprehensible 
false [e.g., Ant eaters eat mostly plants]). As before, half of the items within each 
domain were presented as questions and half as statements (random selection per 
participant). The forced choice task was again administered on PC.  
 
Results and discussion 
 
  As  intended,  incomprehensible sentences ( M  = 3 .89) were rated as less 
comprehensible than unknown (M = 9.64), true (M = 9.77) or false sentences (M = 
9.75), all pairwise ts > 28.0, all ps < .001. Within the three types of comprehensible 
sentences, no differences were obtained, all pairwise ts < .63, all ps > .52. 
The relative bias for mathematics was .21, t(151) = 11.31, p < .001. Across 
types, the relative bias for biology was .32, t(155) = 16.99, p < .001. As expected, 
however, a lower bias was obtained for incomprehensible biology items (M = .26) 
than for comprehensible biology items (M = .34), F(1,152) = 1.92, p < .056. Between 
the conditions involving comprehensible items, no significant differences emerged, 
F(2,152) = 0.01, p > .90 (the means are .345, .339 and .344 for incomprehensible, true 
and false items, respectively), suggesting that plausibility does not affect the bias, and 
hence, that the truth value of a sentence is tangential to the statement bias.  
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EXPERIMENT 4 
 
The aim of  experiment 4 is to replicate the statement bias using sentences 
pertaining to products and services. We refrained from using such sentences in the 
previous experiments because they raise the issue of whether or not consumers view 
them as persuasion attempts and try to cope correspondingly. 
In the current experiment, w e  explicitly addressed the persuasion attempt 
issue: Half of the participants were led to believe that the sentences came from real 
advertisements whereas the other half was explicitly told that the sentences were 
fictitious. We had no clear expectations about this manipulation. On the one hand, 
participants may pay more attention to the linguistic format for ‘real’ sentences than 
for ‘fictitious’ sentences. This would result in a lower bias for sentences that allegedly 
came from real advertisements. On the other hand, sentences coming from real 
advertisements may be processed more deeply. This would result in a more 




Participants. Forty-six psychology students participated for course credit. The 
study was part of a series of unrelated studies taking about an hour.  
 
Material. Using a list of 30 product sentences, two versions of 15 questions 
and 15 statements were created. Fifteen randomly selected sentences were questions 
in the first version and statements in the other version. 
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Procedure. Participants received one of the two versions of 30 sentences on 
paper. Half of them were told that the sentences came from real advertisements and 
their task was to indicate for each sentence whether it had come from a spoken or a 
written advertisement. The other half were told that the sentences were fictitious. 
They had to estimate what percentage of the population would actually understand the 
sentences. Afterwards, participants received all the sentences both as a question and 
as a statement one above the other (randomized order) on paper and had to indicate 
which of the two formats they had seen: statement or question. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
  For each participant, we calculated the r elative ‘bias towards 
statement’.  The relative bias was approximately the same for sentences from real 
advertisement (M = .20) than for fictitious sentences (M = .23), F(1,44) = 0.23, p > 
.63. Importantly, the relative bias was significantly above zero in  both conditions, 
both ts > 4.30, both ps < .001. This replicates the statement bias within the realm of 
consumer behavior. In addition, these findings suggest that similar effects are 
obtained, whether or not the sentences are drawn from persuasive communication. 
This, in turn, suggests that the conclusions drawn in experiments 1 to 3 are also valid 
for sentences that appear in persuasive communication like sentences pertaining to 
products and services. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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  Experiments 1, 2 and 3 are consistent with the idea that during comprehension 
of a sentence, people represent the sentence as a proposition. This proposition may be 
stored in memory, leading to confusion as to whether the given sentence was a 
question or a statement. Moreover, this confusion is asymmetric in nature: Questions 
are more often confused with statements than vice versa.  Factors that promote 
propositional representation, like sentence comprehensibility and depth of processing, 
strengthen the statement bias. Factors that do not affect comprehensibility such as the 
truth value of a sentence do not affect the statement bias, which provides divergent 
validity. Experiment 4 demonstrates that the statement bias effect is also relevant for 
consumer behavior. In addition, whether or not the sentences were featured in a 
persuasive context does not affect the statement bias. 
The statement bias implies that the illusory truth effect may be more general 
than initially believed. The illusory truth effect is that familiar statements are 
considered as more veridical than unfamiliar ones (Begg, Anas, and Farinacci 1992). 
Usually, familiar statements are statements that have been presented before. The 
statement bias implies that a statement may also be familiar because it is the 
propositional representation of a question. As a result, a statement’s perceived 
veridicality may increase not only as it is presented more often, but also as it is 
featured more often in a question.  
Related to the latter point, the statement bias may have implications for public 
policy regarding, for instance, advertising practice. It is forbidden by law to provide 
consumers with untrue, embellished, information if a majority of the consumers 
actually believe the claim to be true (Preston 1994). The statement bias suggests that 
asking questions induces the risk that consumers believe the ‘information’. So, merely 
asking whether brand X is superior to its competitors might be remembered as if Statement bias  21
brand X is actually superior. Moreover, consumers are not used to approach questions 
as persuasion tactics, and hence do not possess persuasion knowledge to deal with 
them (Friestad and Wright 1994). This lack of knowledge of how to deal with 
questions might increase consumer vulnerability to this tactic.  Therefore,  the 
existence of the statement bias suggests that it should be forbidden to ask questions 
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